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NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REVISITED*
MICHAEL A. STEGMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States first became a truly metropolitan nation in 1990
when over half (50.2%) of its citizens lived in the thirty-nine metropoli-
tan areas with populations exceeding one million people.' The urbaniza-
tion of America is not necessarily good news for cities; most
metropolitan growth has been suburban. As a result, less than a third of
the country's population now lives in cities.'
Despite a declining population base, cities continue to play a vital
economic and cultural role in the nation's life: "[T]hey provide safe har-
bor and a takeoff point for each generation's immigrants and for each
region's in- and out-migrants." 3 Nearly as many immigrants arrived on
our shores in the 1980s-600,000 a year-as came during the peak years
of 1900 to 1910.4 Most of these new arrivals head for the cities, adding
"fresh entrepreneurial energy but also vast social service burdens" to
their adopted homelands.5
At the same time, however, dramatic shifts in the nationalities of
immigrants have challenged the acculturation capacities of cities. Dur-
ing the 1980s, for example, only 11% of new arrivals to America were
* This Essay is an expanded version of an unpublished paper, National Urban Policy
Revisited: Alternative Approaches for CED Consideration, prepared at the invitation of the
Committee on Economic Development, September 24, 1992.
** Cary C. Boshamer Professor, Department of City and Regional Planning, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. 1962, Brooklyn College; M.C.P. 1964, University of
Pennsylvania; Ph.D. 1966, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Neal R. Peirce, Citistates: American Metropolises in the New World Economy 6
(1992) (working title of unpublished manuscript).
2. In 1950, cities accounted for 32.8 percent of the nation's population; suburbs,
23.3 percent. By 1960, cities still [had] a small margin over the suburbs, 32.8 percent
to 30.9 percent. By 1970, the suburbs (37.6 percent) had surpassed the cities (31.4
percent). By 1980, cities had 30 percent, compared with 44.8 percent for suburbs.
By 1990, the cities had 31.3 percent, while suburbs had 46.1 percent.
RAYMOND L. FLYNN, REBUILDING AMERICA'S CITIES TOGETHER 26 (1992) (draft).
3. Marshall Kaplan & Franklin James, Urban Policy in the Nineties and Beyond: The
Need for New Approaches, in THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICY 351, 351 (Marshall
Kaplan & Franklin James eds., 1990).
4. Peirce, supra note 1, at 6.
5. Id.
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European, compared to the 1960s, when more than half were European.6
Although the financial burdens that large-scale immigration places on
cities are hard to estimate, a recent report issued by Los Angeles County
estimated that immigration-related costs are approaching a billion dol-
lars, or more than 30% of total expenditures.7
The combination of high rates of immigration and white flight to the
suburbs has contributed to the growth of racial-ethnic minorities in the
demographic majorities in many of our largest cities-57% of the popu-
lation in New York, 62% in Chicago, 63% in Los Angeles, 70% in At-
lanta, 79% in Detroit, and 88% in Miami.8 Moreover, "[t]o make good
their escape from the city and its problems, the new suburbanites often
passed laws prohibiting the city from expanding--condemning it to a fu-
ture as an economic and racial ghetto."9 These factors also have contrib-
uted to growing disparities between the resident incomes and resulting
tax bases of cities and suburbs. Consider the contrast between Charlotte,
North Carolina, and Cleveland, Ohio, two cities with similarly sized met-
ropolitan populations, but dramatically different future prospects:
Charlotte's metropolitan area has gained 600,000 people in
the past 40 years; Cleveland's 700,000. Both are roughly 20
percent black, metrowide. But there the similarities end.
6. Just prior to 1965, over one-half of all immigrants entering the United States
were Europeans and over 30 percent were from North America. Relatively small
percentages were from Asia, Africa and Latin America. By the 1980s, 46 percent of
the immigrants were from Asia as opposed to just 11 percent from Europe. More-
over, while the percentage from North America remained relatively unchanged, im-
migrants from this continent were much more likely to come from the Caribbean,
Mexico and Central America, compared to the 1950s when Mexicans and Canadians
predominated.
NEw YORK DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
IMMIGRATION INTO NEW YORK CITY DURING THE 1980s, at 1 (1992).
7. The report took an expansive view of the immigrant population:
Not only was the currently illegal [alien] included, but also the U.S. born children of
those illegals (who are thus American citizens), those illegals granted amnesty under
the 1986 immigration law, and the legal immigrants to the area since 1980. The four
groups together accounted for about 25% of Los Angeles county's population in
fiscal 1992.
Tim W. Ferguson, California Feels Anti-Immigrant Tremors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1992, at
A10.
The report found that this immigrant amalgam cost the county government $947 million
in services for which it wasn't reimbursed by fees or subventions-or about 3 1% of that year's
total county tab. Yet, it was estimated (and this is more contentious arithmetic than the ex-
pense side of the ledger) that the same group accounted for only 10% of the county tax reve-
nue. Id.
8. John D. Kasarda, Urban Change and Ghetto Revitalization 3 (May 27, 1992) (Con-
gressional Testimony of John D. Kasarda, Dir. of The Kenan Institute of Private Enter., The
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
9. Gene Marlowe, Tale of Two Cities, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 12, 1992, at A19.
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Charlotte has grown, capturing nearly half of the growth
of its metropolitan area. The population of Cleveland has
shrunk, with most of the growth of its metropolitan area com-
ing from people fleeing the city.
Charlotte-with roughly the same size black population-
is far more integrated than Cleveland. Charlotte's residents are
prosperous; per capita income in the city is 118 percent that of
the suburbs. In Cleveland, per capita income is only 62 percent
of that in the suburbs.
The difference: Charlotte was allowed to expand, to follow
its suburbs and keep the middle class-both white and black-
within the city, paying its taxes, running its government and
solving its problems.10
Trapped by geographic boundaries that cannot expand and disad-
vantaged by a labor force that is poorly prepared to compete in a global
economy that places a premium on advanced education, "[c]ities on their
own cannot solve the problems of the poor or of urban decay."'" A
prime example of such a severely distressed city today is Hartford, Con-
necticut, the former insurance capital of the nation which has become the
poorest and one of the most crime-ridden cities in the state.1
Sensitive to the national challenge posed by dramatic shifts in met-
ropolitan settlement patterns, and in partial response to the urban riots of
the 1960s, Congress enacted legislation in 1970 requiring the President to
prepare a biennial urban growth policy report. This Essay traces the
evolution of national urban policies from President Nixon through Presi-
dent Bush, and concludes with recommendations for the 'Clinton Admin-
istration. Section II summarizes how cities have fared since the 1960s,
with particular emphasis on their fiscal condition and problems in their
health, education, and criminal justice systems. Section III summarizes
twenty-three years of national urban policies; and Section IV analyzes
10. Id.
11. FLYNN, supra note 2, at 1.
12. "[Hartford] must carry the baggage of poverty: crime, drugs, welfare depen-
dency, teenage pregnancy, hunger and broken families. Hartford has the highest
number of welfare recipients of any city or town in the state.... Teen pregnancy
shackles city youngsters to the welfare system.... The city has so many halfway
houses, group homes and social service agencies that some streets threaten to become
social service malls.... Crime continues to suck the life out of the city.... Neigh-
borhoods that drew middle-class homesteaders in the 1970s are losing them now
because of crime, taxes and schools.... The public schools, more racially segregated
than some in South Africa, are a disaster [and,] ... [t]he four-year dropout rate in
the high schools is more than 50 percent .... City government is beset by bureau-
cratic inefficiency and expensive union contracts."
Peirce, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting Tom Condon, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 17-24, 1991).
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the principal reasons why these policies have been largely ineffective.
The final Section presents three national urban policy scenarios for
consideration, with the preferred alternative combining an aggressive
program of national investment in productivity-increasing human and in-
frastructure capital with community-based, public-private partnerships.
II. How CITIES HAVE FARED
With structural changes in the national economy13 having contrib-
uted to the growth of an urban underclass, 14 and continuing problems
with our educational, health care, housing, and welfare systems, one
might conclude that all cities and most African AmericansI 5 are worse
off today than they were when the riots broke out in the late 1960s.
While many cities are reeling from the recessions of the 1980s and more
than a decade of relative federal neglect, they are not without hope. De-
spite their seemingly intractable problems, many cities are creating their
own "macroeconomic" policies to make them more competitive in the
"information age" global economy where "it's possible for millions of
dollars to move in seconds from Miami to Milan, Dallas to Dhahran."' 16
For example, "San Antonio is aggressively marketing itself as
'Telecity,'" and "New York City has a 'teleport'-an antenna farm on
Staten Island linked to a regional fiber optic network-that permits the
Big Apple's communications-hungry banks, brokerage houses and travel
industries instant access to satellites and other global telecommunica-
tions media."17
Although conditions have worsened demonstrably for poor African
Americans living in drug-plagued, inner-city communities, there is some
evidence that a substantial percentage of blacks have improved their lives
and work in the last thirty years.18 The income gap between affluent and
13. See, eg., John D. Kasarda, The Severely Distressed in Economically Transforming Cit-
ies, in DRUGS, CRIME AND SOCIAL ISOLATION 45, 65-82 (Adele V. Harrell & George E. Peter-
son eds., 1992).
14. In 1959, only 27% of the poor resided in metropolitan central cities. Kasarda, supra
note 8, at 1. By 1985, the central cities housed over half of the nation's population living in
census tracts with high concentrations of poverty, up from just one-third in 1972. Kasarda,
supra note 13, at 46 (citing ROBERT REISCHAUER, THE GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION OF
POVERTY: WHAT Do WE KNow?). During the 1959-85 period, "the proportion of poor
blacks living in central cities rose from 38 percent to 61 percent." Kasarda, supra note 8, at 1.
15. Editor's Note: The contributors to this symposium have used the terms "African
American," "black," and "black American," often interchangeably, in their articles. The
North Carolina Law Review has elected to defer to its contributors' choices in the absence of
any universally accepted racial or ethnic designation.
16. Peirce, supra note 1, at 5.
17. Id. at 4-5.
18. Linda Chavez, The New Polemics of Race, CITY J., Summer 1992, at 12 (reviewing
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poor blacks is greater today than the gap between blacks and whites. 19
"[I]n the past 20 years, black families with incomes of $35,000, grew
from 15.7 to 21.2 percent and black families with incomes of $50,000
increased 350 percent."'
Some economists, however, see these gains as illusory and short-
lived. Bennett Harrison and Lucy Gorham, among others, argue that the
above-cited gains cannot be sustained for three reasons: most of the in-
come gains reflected the increase in two-wage earner families rather than
higher real wage income for full-time workers;2 the incidence of well-
paid black workers, both men and women, fell during the 1980s;22 and
the number of black families headed by single women 'who are the sole
breadwinners rose. Consequently,
[i]n the absence of a truly major national policy effort to pro-
mote affirmative action in hiring and promotion, comparable
worth, higher hourly wage rates for part-time workers, and ex-
tensive job training tied to well-paid stable employment oppor-
tunities, most black families, even more than white families,
need two or more earners to attain a middle-class standard of
living.2 3
Like their white counterparts, higher-income blacks are moving out
of the cities. Forty-nine percent of all African American households on
Long Island make more money than does the typical white household in
America. "The majority of all black people in the Washington area do
not live in the District of Columbia. They live in the suburbs."' 24 In
1989, 26% of all black households lived in the suburbs, and 43% owned
ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE; SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL
(1992)).
19. The Plight of African-American Men in Urban America: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 263 (1991) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Robert L. Woodson, President, National Center for Neighborhood
Enterprise).
20. Id.
21. "Between 1979 and 1987, the proportion of white families with two or more wage-
earners rose from 57 percent to 59 percent. But for black families, the change was in the
opposite direction, from 50 percent in 1979 down to 46 percent in 1987." Bennett Harrison &
Lucy Gorham, What Happened to African-American Wages in the 1980s?, in THE METROPO-
LIS IN BLACK AND WHITE: PLACE, POWER AND POLARIZATION 56, 58 (George C. Galster &
Edward W. Hill eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK AND WHITE].
22. Between 1979 and 1987, "whites, as a whole, suffered a decline in the number of high-
wage workers over this period of under 1 percent, while among blacks there were actually 7
percent fewer high-wage workers in 1987 than in 1979." Id. at 61.
23. Id. at 57.
24. Joel Garreau, Candidates Take Note: It's a Mall World After All, WASH. POST NAT'L
WKLY. EDITION, Aug. 10-16, 1992, at 25.
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their own homes.25 In 1960, about 2% of Cleveland's black population
lived in the suburbs; by 1990, a third did.26
A. Fiscal Conditions
It is also difficult to generalize about the changing fiscal conditions
of cities since the late 1960s. Not only are local economies subject to
national business and growth cycles, they are also affected by regional
swings that affect both revenues and expenditures. Even so, one thing is
certain. During the past thirty years, America's cities have suffered se-
vere declines in iesident incomes and tax bases as a result of the flight of
jobs and the middle class to the suburbs. In some metropolitan areas,
this flight has become so great as to have all but pauperized the central
city.
2 7
Although these trends suggest that cities are experiencing growing
fiscal trauma, some measures of fiscal health actually show cities to be
doing better today. Measured in terms of liquidity, cash balances and
deficit position, cities were in a better cash position in the mid-1980s than
they were ten years earlier when New York was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy.28 Roy Bahl attributes this improved performance to a combina-
tion of more "conservative budgeting and fiscal planning" and the fact
that "cities seem to have done a better job of expanding and contracting
their budgets depending on the performance of their economies."29
25. Similarly, about 39% of all Hispanic households lived in suburbs in 1989. F. JOHN
DEVANEY, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, SERIES H123191-1,
HOUSING IN AMERICA: 1989/90, at 10 (1992).
26. In the Cleveland metropolitan area, an overwhelming percentage of all black subur-
banites live in just one community, East Cleveland, which suggests that locational choices for
blacks who have managed to move out of Cleveland's ghetto continue to be restricted in the
suburbs. From 1960 to 1970, for example, East Cleveland's population went from 2 to 51%
black. Norman Krumholz, The Kerner Commission Twenty Years Later, in THE METROPOLIS
IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 21, at 19, 25.
27. In 1960, the per capita income of cities was 5% greater than their surrounding sub-
urbs. In 1980, per capita income of cities was 89% of that for the surrounding suburbs. By
1989, the percentage had fallen to 84%. In some metropolitan areas, the economic disparities
between city and suburbs are particularly acute. Newark's per capita income was only 43.1%
of its suburbs; in Paterson, New Jersey it was 46.6%; in Cleveland, 53.4%; in Hartford,
53.6%; in Detroit, 53.6%; in Milwaukee, 62.9%; in Gary, Indiana, 63.4%; in Baltimore,
64.3%; in Philadelphia, 65.4%; in Dayton, 66%; in Chicago, 66.3%; in Miami, 67.2%, and in
New York, 67.6%. FLYNN, supra note 2, at 26.
28. "The experience of the 30 large cities surveyed over the period 1971-1984 shows that
in the aggregate the governments (excluding New York) had an excess of revenues, as com-
pared with expenditures, in 9 of those years and a deficiency of revenues in 5 of them." Philip
M. Dearborn, Fiscal Conditions in large American Cities, 1971-1984, in URBAN CHANGE AND
POVERTY 255, 266 (Michael G.H. McGeary & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. eds., 1988).
29. Roy W. Bahl, States and the Financial Condition of Cities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
1742 [Vol. 71
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When municipal performance is measured more broadly, however,
there are indications that the fiscal health of large cities generally has
deteriorated. According to Helen Ladd and John Yinger, the average
city experienced an eleven percentage point decline in its standardized
fiscal health between 1972 and 1982, but "actual fiscal health is markedly
poorer in central cities with large populations than in those with small
populations."' 30 Bald raises an interesting point about the fiscal responsi-
bility debate. While conservative budgeting has helped cities balance
their budgets, they have done so by "deferring their expenditures on cer-
tain activities to later years and allowing those public services to
deteriorate., 31
Public finance experts might disagree about this issue, but one thing
is clear: Today, cities must rely more heavily on their own devices for
raising revenues. 32 Federal dollars have been sharply cut since the 1970s.
This is especially true for large cities where direct federal aid as a per-
centage of locally raised revenues fell from 34% in 1977 to below 10% in
1987.13 A 1992 report from the National League of Cities cites four rea-
sons for increasing fiscal pressure: (1) the cost of unfunded state and
EIGHTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION-TAx INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA 81, 82 (Frederick D. Stocker ed., 1990).
30. The average actual fiscal health of cities with populations below 100,000 is 20 percent-
age points above the 1982 average, whereas the average fiscal health of the largest cities is 43
percentage points below the average. HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER, AMERICA'S AILING
CmEs: FISCAL HEALTH AND THE DESIGN OF URBAN POLICY 195-98 (1989).
31. Bahl, supra note 29, at 82.
32. In 1959, local governments financed 28 cents of every dollar of expenditures
from state and federal aid, whereas in 1975 the share was 43 cents and in 1978 it was
46 cents. The large urban aid programs-which went directly to cities-were an
even more important story. For example, federal aid to cities as a percent of total
revenues raised from own sources were as high as 70 percent in Cleveland, Buffalo
and Detroit in 1978. This explains why local governments remained in a growth
mode during much of the mid to late 1970s. The continuous increase in intergovern-
mental aid contributed to the attitude of local officials that external finances would
pick up part of any shortfall due to recession.
The fiscal restructuring of local governments began after the recession. Real
levels of per capita spending, taxes and debt continued to rise between 1975 and
1978, but the line was held on state and local government employment levels and
employee compensation.... The real cuts, however, started after 1978 when two
important events occurred. Proposition[s] 13 and 2-1/2 signaled the 'official' unwill-
ingness of voters to go along with further tax increases, and the election of Ronald
Reagan in 1980 underlined this. The decline in federal aid to state and local govern-
ments began in 1978.
Roy W. Bahl et al., Local Governments and the Current Recession 14-15 (1991).
33. Bahl, supra note 29, at 82. For cities under a million, federal government revenues as
a percent of government municipal revenue declined from 14.3% in 1979-80, to 4.8% in 1989-
90. FLYNN, supra note 2, at 21.
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federal mandates, (2) the depressed state of local economies, (3) high in-
frastructure needs, and (4) the rising cost of health benefits for municipal
employees.34 To deal with the general revenue shortfall, cities were
forced, among other actions, to freeze budgets, raise taxes, and lay off
municipal employees.3 5 For those who argue for state involvement in
addressing the problems of cities targeted by the Clinton Administration,
a cautionary note: As a result of the recession, in 1991, fifteen states
reduced local grants-in-aid-some by as much as 25%.36
While the fiscal vitality of our cities is decidedly mixed, it is fair to
say that many of the nation's largest cities have experienced fiscal deteri-
oration since the 1960s. The transformation of our economy from a pri-
marily goods-producing economy to a knowledge-based information
economy caused a decrease in total manufacturing employment. Larger,
older cities took the biggest hits: between 1967 and 1987, Detroit lost
51% of its manufacturing jobs; New York City, 58%; Chicago, 60%;
and Philadelphia, 64%.
B. Increasing Demands on Urban Services
1. Health Care
Deterioration is apparent in our health care system as well as in our
cities. The incidence of specific health problems is generally higher in
central cities than in the nation as a whole, and higher still in big cities,
especially those with large minority populations. A case in point is infant
mortality. The infant mortality rate in the United States ranks twentieth
in the world, primarily due to excessively high rates in major cities.38
The 1989 national infant mortality rate was 10.0 infant deaths per 1000
live births. In Washington, D.C., however, the 1989 infant mortality rate
34. MICHAEL A. PAGANO, CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 1992: A RESEARCH REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CIrIEs vi (1992).
35. Id. at v. According to Pagano, 73.4% of surveyed cities reduced the rate at which
their operating spending increased; 71.5% raised taxes and fees, or imposed new ones; 61.2%
reduced their capital spending; 44.2% froze municipal hiring; 39.5% reduced their work
forces; and 14% reduced service levels. Id.
36. For example, New York cut revenue sharing by $343 million, including a 25
percent cut for New York City. Georgia cut aid to cities by at least $40 million.
Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois proposed that the state keep the $237 million share of
a temporary income tax surcharge that was to go to municipalities, but was over-
turned by the House. Boston lost $85 million in state aid during 1989-1991.
Roy W. Bahl et al., City Finances and the National Economy, PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Sum-
mer 1992, at 49, 61.
37. Kasarda, supra note 13, at 71.
38. FLYNN, supra note 2, at 16.
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was 22.9; Detroit reached 21.1; Philadelphia, 17.6; and Chicago, 17.0. 9
Among black children, the rates were drastically higher: 26.5 in Wash-
ington, D.C.; Detroit, 23.9; Philadelphia, 23.5; and Chicago, 22.4.'
High mortality rates are not only a problem among infants. "Na-
tionally, black men in inner city neighborhoods are less likely to reach
the age of 65 than men in Bangladesh, one of the poorest nations in the
world."' 41 The declining life expectancy of black males is not a function
of elevated death rates among older males, but the result of higher death
rates for younger men due to a homicide epidemic in inner cities. A
major inner-city hospital in Los Angeles reported in 1991 that 51% of its
patients had gunshot wounds, compared to only 19% in 1985.42 In addi-
tion, high levels of psychological stress in the form of depression, alco-
holism, and substance abuse causes excess mortality rates among urban
minorities. "[C]ardiovascular disease, a stress-related condition, ac-
counts for almost one quarter of the excess mortality cited in" a
landmark study of black males in Harlem.43 Finally, municipal hospitals
in large cities have been pushed beyond the breaking point trying to cope
with a growing AIDS epidemic. In New York City, 83% of women
with AIDS and 61% of all AIDS patients are Hispanic or black.'
2. Poverty and Homelessness
Between 1979 and 1989, the number of people living in poverty grew
by 4.3 million to more than 31 million.45 Poverty is not restricted to
urban areas, but it is more concentrated there. In 1989, 30% of all poor
39. Id
40. Id
41. Hearings, supra note 19, at 24 (statement of L. Douglas Wilder, Governor, Common-
wealth of Virginia).
42. FLYNN, supra note 2, at 18. Nationally, the "death rate from homoide... for Black
males ages 25 to 34 is almost 5 times as high as for Black females .... 7.4 times as high as for
white males..., and 24 times as high as the rate for white females." TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY COMM'N ON AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES, FROM CONSTERNATION TO CONSERVA-
TION: TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF BLACK MALES, reprinted
in Hearings, supra note 19, at 8 (submitted to the 'reord by Senator Sanford).
43. THE URBAN INST., CONFRONTING THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS: FROM WATTS
(1965) TO SOUTH CENTRAL Los ANGELES (1992), at 46 (1992) (prepared statement of Dr.
Billy E. Jones, Commissioner, New York Mental Health). Also, while only 28% of the total
population of New York City is black, one-third of the admissions to inpatient psychiatric
units of municipal hospitals in New York City are black, as are 68% of the city's single,
homeless, mentally ill population. Id.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Felicity Barringer, New Census Data Reveal Redistribution of Poverty, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1992, at A14.
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households lived in the suburbs46 and were as likely to have housing
problems as those living in cities. The percentage of the nation's poor
living in central cities continues to grow: from 30% in 1968, to 37% in
1979, to 43.1% in 1989.17 What is unique about urban poverty is its
intense racial and spatial concentration. a While no municipality seems
to be too small to have some homeless people, homelessness has reached
epidemic proportions in major cities. Martha Burt found:
During the recession of 1981-1982, emergency shelters and
soup kitchens began reporting a greatly increased demand for
their services, reflecting the effects of high unemployment, a ris-
ing cost of living, and a retrenchment in government programs
that cushioned earlier economic downturns. Even when eco-
nomic conditions improved after 1983, homelessness seemed to
continue growing. The size of the homeless population was es-
timated at 250,000 to 350,000 for 1984 . . . and 500,000 to
600,000 for 1987 .... A comparison of these estimates yields
an annual rate of increase of about 22 percent for these three
years. As the decade progressed, the homeless population in-
creasingly included new groups of people, such as mothers with
children, and more of certain types of individuals, such as the
severely mentally ill and drug abusers.49
As Burt suggests, in New York and elsewhere, the most rapidly
growing segment of the homeless population is families with children.
Throughout the 1970s, the number of homeless families in New York
City's emergency shelter system totaled just under 1000. Most of these
families were displaced by fire, illness, or other short-term crisis.50 To-
day, there are more than 5200 homeless families in New York City, with
close to 1000 new families entering the shelter system each month.5 1
Moreover, today's homelessness is often not a result of an immediate cri-
sis. Today, more than 45% of all homeless families in New York have
never had a place of their own to live; only 37% of homeless individuals
46. Forty-one percent of poor households were in central cities and 29% were in nonme-
tropolitan areas. DEVANEY, supra note 25, at 12.
47. FLYNN, supra note 2, at 23.
48. In 1985, for example, 54.6% of all families with a poverty level income lived in cen-
tral-city poverty areas that the Census Bureau defined as census tracts where 20% or more of
the residents lived below the poverty line. The 1985 poverty rate among central-city blacks
was 32.1%, compared with 14.9% among whites; in census tract poverty areas it was 41.2%
and 34.2%, respectively, for blacks and whites. URBAN CHANGE AND POVERTY, supra note
28, at 16.
49. MARTHA R. BURT, OVER THE EDGE: THE GROWTH OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE
1980s, at 3 (1992).
50. HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS, INC., THE NEW POVERTY: A GENERATION OF HOME-
LESS FAMILIES 1 (1992).
51. Id. at 2.
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have a high school degree; only 40% of all family heads have at least six
months of work experience; and over 70% have varied levels of drug and
alcohol abuse.5 2
In a study of homeless families in Los Angeles, a similar pattern was
reported: "Homeless mothers reported more spousal abuse and drug
abuse by their mates and were more likely to have had a child abuse
report opened on the family and more likely to have personally required
hospitalization for mental illness" than were a comparison group of poor
housed families.5 3 Also, "[a] history of substance abuse and family vio-
lence were more often reported for the homeless mothers' own family of
origin. ' 54
3. Education
As the earlier reference to Hartford's schools suggested, 5 no institu-
tion is in a greater state of crisis than the urban school system. "More
people than ever graduate from high school. But in our big cities many
of those who graduate are barely literate."56 "The reading scores of
black 17-year-olds from disadvantaged urban communities are no better
than the reading scores of white 13-year-olds from more advantaged
communities."5 " Today, "45 percent of black children and about three-
quarters of immigrants are educated in or around 11 big cities.""8 And,
while black males comprise about 6% of today's civilian labor force, they
and other minorities are projected to comprise more than half of all new
labor market entrants in the year 2000.19 Thus, "a large fraction of these
workers will enter the job market as products of urban schools or urban
job training programs-preparatory mechanisms that are failing minority
groups."' 60  Financial returns from education are also lower for blacks
and other minorities than they are for whites because of racial discrimi-
nation in the workplace.61
52. Id. at 3.
53. David Wood et al., Homeless and Housed Families in Los Angeles: A Study Compar-
ing Demographic, Economic and Family Function Characteristics, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1049, 1050 (1990).
54. Id.
55. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56. THE URBAN INST., supra note 43, at 3.
57. Id.
58. Id at 13.
59. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COMM'N ON AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES, supra note 42,
at 8.
60. THE URBAN INST., supra note 43, at 8 (emphasis added).
61. In 1987, 17.1% of whites with four or more years of college still worked under the
poverty line. Among blacks, the comparable proportion was 20%. Harrison & Gorham,
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4. Crime
Finally, no assessment of the current state of urban America and
future prospects can ignore crime and the role that the criminal justice
system plays in contemporary America and in the lives of young African
Americans and other minority young men. In America's urban areas
there is a murder every twenty-two minutes; a forcible rape every five
minutes; a robbery every forty-nine seconds; and an aggravated assault
every thirty seconds. 62 To punctuate the seeming inability of our na-
tional government to stem the rise of urban violence, our nation's capital
has become the murder capital of the nation.63 The incidence of lawless-
ness is more concentrated in some areas than others, as is illustrated by
the fact that three-quarters of New York State's entire prison population
comes from and preys upon just seven neighborhoods in New York
City.64
Rising crime rates are not exclusive to our largest cities. Between
1985 and 1990, crimes against persons increased by more than 50% in
eight out of twenty-five surveyed cities with populations of 250,000 or
more.65 Fear of crime pervades cities of all sizes, adversely affects life
styles, restricts the use of urban spaces, and fuels racial antagonisms.
The rise of violent crimes during the 1980s has been linked to drug activi-
ties that have provided increased, albeit illegal, earnings opportunities for
poorly educated, unemployed, minority young men. A recent study of
incarcerated young offenders concluded that expected returns from ille-
gal work exceeded those for legal work for both blacks and whites, but
because of lower employment and earnings possibilities, the ratio of ex-
supra note 21, at 66. Just over one in eight African-American college graduates were earning
as much as $35,000 a year in 1987, while white college graduates with equivalent years of
schooling were twice as likely to be paid that amount (26.1% vs. 13.1%). Id.
62. NATIONAL COMM'N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. Hous., PARTNERSHIP IN
CRIME PREVENTION, FINAL SUMMARY 5 (1992).
63. In 1988 .... 372 people were murdered in [Washington, D.C., a] city of slightly
fewer than 600,000 people. That was a record. So was the 1989 figure of 434. And
the 1990 number of 483. And 1991's 489. So far this year, murders are off 10 per-
cent from last year, but Washington still has the highest per capita murder rate in the
country.... [Miore people per capita are arrested in Washington[, D.C.] than any-
where else, followed by South Africa.
Felicity Barringer, Washington's Departing Police Chief Laments the Sleep of Murderers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at 4-7.
Violent crime rates are also very high in other large cities. For example, Miami and
Atlanta each averaged more than four crimes against persons per 1000 population in 1990,
compared to a national average of less than one. JOHN P. VITELLA, SECURITY, CRIME AND
DRUGS IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A REVIEW OF PROGRAMS AND EXPENDITURES 35-36 (1992).
64. Francis X. Clines, Ex-Inmates Urge Return to Areas of Crime to Help, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1992, at Al.
65. VITELLA, supra note 63, at 2.
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pected legal earnings to illegal earnings was much lower for blacks. 6
One result of these perverse economic incentives is frequent involvement
with the local law enforcement system. Today, "one-quarter of black
men ages 20 to 29 are in jail, in prison, or under a parole officer's supervi-
sion."'6 7 "Run-ins with the law are so common among young males in
inner-city areas that most of the stigma associated with being an offender
is gone, and tensions between the community and the police are high."68
In addition to forming a disproportionately large share of all prisoners,
blacks are also more often the victims of crime.6 9
The cost of operating and expanding the criminal justice system is
staggering. In 1988, direct expenditures on the criminal justice system
by all levels of government totaled about $61 billion, including $14.9 bil-
lion for operating the state and federal prison systems.70 Today, the cost
of building a single prison bed ($53,663)71 is about the same as building a
subsidized home for a low-income family. Interestingly, corrections
spending is the second fastest growing item in state budgets-after Medi-
caid.72 This suggests that without dramatic reform, the criminal justice
system will continue to drain resources that could be used for investment
in human capital and other more productive purposes for years to come.
5. Economic Decline and the Underclass
To conclude this Section, it should be noted that analysis of the pro-
gress of cities since the late 1960s also must address the issue of the urban
underclass. Whether used in an economic context as originally intended
by Myrdal to describe people who have become technologically unem-
ployable, or in a behavioral context to describe poor people who do not
fit mainstream values, there is a consensus on two points: Regardless of
how cities as a whole have fared since the late 1960s, the underclass pop-
ulation has grown significantly, and its spatial concentration has intensi-
66. Hearings, supra note 19, at 62-63 (testimony of Samuel L. Myers, Jr.).
67. THE URBAN INST., supra note 43, at 3.
68. Id. at 3-4.
69. Hearings, supra note 19, at 12. In 1987, 49.1 black males per 1,000 persons were
victims of violence compared to 31.5 black females, 35 white males, and 20.1 white females.
For younger black males, these rates were even higher. Nearly 91 crimes of violence per 1,000
persons were committed against black males between 12 and 15 years of age. The rate for 16
to 19 year-old black males was even higher, 101 per 1,000 persons. In 1988, 51.5% of all
murders and homicides of black males were committed by other black males. Id.
70. Id. at 13.
71. d
72. THE URBAN INST., supra note 43, at 3.
1993] 1749
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fled within the urban fabric. 73
The most recent manifestation of these phenomena is the Los Ange-
les riots of April 1992, which one scholar sees as "the consequence of a
lethal linkage of economic decline, cultural decay and political lethargy
in American life."' 74 To set the stage for the urban policy challenge con-
fronting the Clinton Administration and as a contemporary context for
rethinking the Kerner Commission Report, consider the case of Los An-
geles. Here is a summary of twelve conditions that currently affect the
quality of life in Los Angeles and South Central Los Angeles:
(1) "Los Angeles is one of the most segregated communities
in the United States." "[Sixty] percent of the census tracts
in Los Angeles have almost no African American
residents."
(2) "Black families in Los Angeles bear a disproportionate
share of the poverty there. Black people constitute only
13 percent of the city's population, but they comprise 18
percent of the low-income renter households. .. ." "Un-
employment among black people in Los Angeles runs
twice the rate for the county as a whole."
(3) "In South Central itself, the median annual household in-
come is $20,000, barely half the $38,000 median income
for the county as a whole, and 17 percent of the house-
holds have incomes beneath $7,500, compared with the
county-wide figure of 7.6 percent."
(4) "[T]here [are] only 11 supermarkets in South Central, one
for every 40,000 people, whereas South Central would
have had 22 supermarkets if it merely had the average for
Los Angeles as a whole, and would have even more if it
had as many as are in the white neighborhoods."
(5) "[T]here are only 53 bank branches in all of South Cen-
tral, whereas there would be more than twice that number
73. At the same time, however, the scale of the underclass problem should not be over-
stated. According to the General Accounting Office:
[R]egardless of how they define the term, most experts agree that the urban under-
class comprises a relatively small percentage of the population.... [S]ize estimates
range from less than 2 million, based on the able-bodied persistently poor in urban
areas, to 5.6 million, based upon census tracts with high poverty concentrations. The
number of residents in census tracts with high concentrations of families headed by
women, school dropouts, welfare dependents, and jobless men is 2.5 million. The
highest estimate of the U.S. urban underclass accounts for 13 percent of the nation's
poverty population and 3 percent of its total population.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE URBAN UNDERCLASS: DISTURBING PROBLEMS DE-
MANDING AITENTION 6 (1990).
74. Cornel West, L.A. Riots Spawned by Spiritual Poverty, Justifiable Rage, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1992, at 17A.
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if South Central had as many banks per person as does the
rest of Los Angeles.... [T]he banks and S&Ls [in L.A.]
make fewer loans in the lower-income and minority neigh-
borhoods than in the city as a whole, [even when differ-
ences in income are taken into account]."
(6) "There are fewer manufacturing jobs in South Central
than in Los Angeles County as a whole: one for every 19
people, in contrast to one for every 14 county-wide. South
Central lost 70,000 manufacturing jobs from 1978-1982
alone."
(7) "The Los Angeles Unified School District is growing by
15,000 students a year, crowding the system so much it
had been forced to bus children across town, resort to a
year-round schedule, spill over into temporary trailers and
jam classrooms with as many as 37 students per teacher.
More than half of the students are from families with in-
comes low enough to qualify for free meals, and a third of
the students-up from 7 percent a decade ago--have lim-
ited English."
(8) "[O]nly 20 percent of the residents could afford the me-
dian priced home, which sold for $210,850 in 1991. The
average asking rent rose to $690 in 1990, an increase of
139 percent from 1980, during a decade in which median
family income rose only 85 percent.... HUD's fair mar-
ket rent for a two-bedroom unit is $804 in Los Angeles
County and $900 in Orange County.... A mother with
two children on welfare receives $663 a month ......
(9) "Forty-two thousand families live in garages illegally con-
verted into living spaces . . . . Every night, 20,000 to
30,000 people are homeless [in Los Angeles], and over the
course of a year 100,000 to 175,000 persons are homeless
for some period."75
III. TWENTY-THREE YEARS OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICIES
A. The Nixon Years
National urban policy has been a concern of the executive and legis-
lative branches of the federal government since 1969, when President
Nixon created a National Goals Research Staff to lead the executive
branch's efforts to "project future trends-and thus to make the kind of
informed choices which are necessary if we are to establish mastery over
75. National Hous. Law Project, Inc., Racial Discrimination, Poverty and Housing Poli-
cies: A Call for Justice in Los Angeles and Nationwide, 22 HOUSING L. BULL. 45, 45-48 (1992)
(footnotes omitted).
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the process of change."' 7 6 Appointing Daniel Patrick Moynihan, his
chief urban advisor, as executive secretary to the Council for Urban Af-
fairs "was a signal [to the nation's mayors] that central cities would be
the focus of [a Nixon] urban policy." 7 7 The Council's charge was to de-
velop "coherent, consistent patterns" of activities that the national gov-
ernment should encourage or discourage in responding to the
urbanization of American life.78 Against a backdrop of urban riots, ra-
cial discrimination, a growing fiscal division between cities and suburbs,
and a seeming inability of state and local political institutions to respond
to these problems, Moynihan summarized his analysis of the major ur-
banization issues confronting the nation to the following ten points, that
seem equally as relevant today as twenty-three years ago:
1. Poverty and social isolation of minority groups in central
cities.
2. Enormous imbalances between urban areas and in pro-
grams that affect them.
3. Inadequate structure and capacity in local government.
4. Fiscal instability in urban government.
5. Lack of equality in public services among jurisdictions
within metropolitan areas.
6. Migration of people displaced by technology, and from
central cities to suburban areas.
7. Inadequate structure and capacity of states in their indis-
pensable roles in managing urban affairs.
8. Ineffective incentive systems to encourage state and local
governments and private interests to help implement the
goals of federal policy.
9. Lack of adequate information as well as extensive and sus-
tained research on urban problems.
10. An insufficient sense of the finite resources of the national
environment and the fundamental importance of aesthetics
in successful urban growth.7 9
President Nixon proposed a "national growth policy" in his 1970
State of the Union message, and Title VII of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 197080 formalized the executive branch's responsi-
bilities in this area by requiring the President to deliver a biennial report
76. Charles J. Orlebeke, Chasing Urban Policy: A Critical Retrospect, in THE FUTURE OF
NATIONAL URBAN POLICY 185, 189 (Marshall Kaplan & Franklin James eds., 1990).
77. Id at 186.
78. Mary K. Nenno, Urban Policy Revisited-Issues Resurface With a New Urgency, 3 J.
PLAN. LITERATURE 253, 253 (1988).
79. Id. at 254.
80. Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1791 (1970).
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on urban growth. Stimulated by the previous decade's mass migrations
from rural and small-town America to the nation's major metropolitan
centers, which floundered in their ability to manage this growth, coupled
with a belief that concerted national action could dramatically change
the settlement patterns and the urban landscape, the Nixon urban
growth policy featured the concept of "[a] national program of new city-
building [that] would capture a good share of population growth and
would also have strong symbolic value in recasting the image of what
cities should be like.""1 A new communities-centered national urban
growth policy was fostered by the work of a blue-ribbon panel that had
enormous faith in the ability of the federal government to stimulate the
private sector to create ten new towns which would become a blueprint
for an entirely new urban fabric.8 2 In retrospect, the new communities
policy was poorly timed because people began leaving the cities in droves
long before the building could begin.8 3
B. The Ford Urban Policy
Although it was never formally unveiled, in anticipation of an elec-
tion victory in 1976 the Ford administration did draft an urban policy
that would "put the urban back into urban policy."8 4 Organized around
the concept of "targeted New Federalism,"
[t]he policy called for targeting more federal money to dis-
81. Orlebeke, supra note 76, at 189.
82. According to Orlebeke:
The rough arithmetic of the most enthusiastic new communities proponents went as
follows: "If we allocate one-half of the coming 100 million people to existing periph-
eral growth around existing cities and 10 percent to small towns and farms, the re-
maining 40 million would require the building of 20 cities of one million people each
and 200 new towns of 100,000 each." More modestly, the National Committee on
Urban Growth Policy, in making its own recommendations, simply sliced the goal in
half to ten big new cities and one hundred smaller ones.
Id. (quoting William E. Finley, A Fresh Start, in THE NEW Crry (Praeger 1969)).
83. According to Franklin James:
1970 represented a watershed in U.S. patterns of population growth. Before that
year, population migration was from rural areas to metropolitan areas, contributing
to the congestion problems identified by the [C]ongress. Following 1970, a mounting
number of people left the cities and suburbs for nonmetropolitan areas-as part of a
process of demographic and economic decline that accelerated as the 1970s
progressed. This shift was unanticipated and rendered the 1970 urban policy obso-
lete overnight .... Between 1970 and 1980, twenty of the fifty-six largest US cities
experienced population declines of more than 10%. By contrast, only six US cities
had such declines during the previous decade.
Franklin J. James, President Carter's Comprehensive National Urban Policy: Achievements and
Lessons Learned, 8 ENV'T & PLAN. C.: GOv'T & PoL'Y 29, 30-31 (1990).
84. Orlebeke, supra note 76, at 197.
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tressed areas by revising the distribution formulas for general
revenue sharing and other block grant programs. Tax revision
was also proposed which would encourage housing rehabilita-
tion and central city redevelopment. Although the policy state-
ment did not promise any new spending, it did advocate a
countercyclical "kicker" to the Community Development
Block Grant program, which, if enacted, would have sent
an additional $900 million to cities with high rates of
unemployment.85
Shortly after the 1976 election, the focus of national urban growth
policy shifted permanently from a concern with broad patterns of urban-
ization to the growing problems of America's cities. Title VI of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 amended the 1970
legislation by dropping the word growth and requiring the President to
issue a biennial report on urban policy in February of even-numbered
years beginning in 1978,86 and expanded the scope and content of the
policy to include energy conservation, population distribution, and tax
base considerations.8 7 In that same legislation, Congress declared that
the national urban policy should be action- and interventionist-oriented,
stimulate economic growth in communities of all sizes and regions, com-
bat rural and urban poverty, and better orchestrate the delivery of federal
programs.8 8
85. Id.
86. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1143-44 (1977).
87. Id. at 1143.
88. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 4502(d) declares that the national urban policy should:
(I) favor patterns of urbanization and economic development and stabilization
which offer a range of alternative locations and encourage the wise and balanced use
of physical and human resources in metropolitan and urban regions as well as in
smaller urban places that have a potential for accelerated growth;
(2) foster the continued economic strength of all parts of the United States,
including central cities, suburbs, smaller communities, local neighborhoods and rural
areas;
(3) encourage patterns of development and redevelopment which minimize dis-
parities among States, regions and cities;
(4) treat comprehensively the problems of poverty and employment (including
the erosion of tax bases, and the need for better community services and job opportu-
nities) which are associated with disorderly urbanization and rural decline;
(5) develop means to encourage good housing for all Americans without regard
to race or creed;
(6) refine the role of the Federal Government in revitalizing existing communi-
ties and encouraging planned, large-scale urban and new community development;
(7) strengthen the capacity of general governmental institutions to contribute to
balanced urban growth and stabilization; and
(8) facilitate increased coordination in the administration of Federal programs
to encourage desirable patterns of urban development and redevelopment, encourage
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C. The Carter Urban Policy
President Jimmy Carter took office midway into a decade that wit-
nessed a reversal of fortunes in America's great cities. HUD's index of
"resident need," which included data on poverty, unemployment, and
income growth, confirmed the decline of large cities during the 1970-80
decade:
As of 1970, this index was significantly higher compared with
the [U.S.] as a whole in only three of the fifty-six big cities:
Newark, New Orleans, and El Paso. By 1980, twenty of the big
cities showed such high levels of resident needs. If distressed
cities are defined as those suffering both high resident need and
rapid population loss, then no big U.S. city was distressed as of
1970, [but] fourteen of the fifty-six big cities met such standards
for distress by 1980.89
In a speech to mayors during his 1976 campaign, President Carter
recognized the growing urban problem and made a commitment to doing
something about it:
I think we stand at a turning point in history. If, a hundred
years from now, this Nation's experiment in democracy has
failed, I suspect that historians will trace that failure to our
own era, when a process of decay began in our inner cities and
was allowed to spread unchecked throughout our society.
But I do not believe that must happen. I believe that
working together, we can turn the tide, stop the decay, and set
in motion a process of growth that by the end of the century
can give us cities worthy of the greatest Nation on earth.90
Carter repudiated the suburban-oriented Nixon growth policies that
"subsidized the out-migration of middle income people and business
from existing facilities in cities."91 Carter's Administration's urban poli-
cies were premised on the belief that a growing number of America's
cities were "finding it increasingly difficult to fulfill their historical roles
as symbols of choice, hope and opportunity; places where millions of for-
eign immigrants and native-born Americans have sought to better their
own lives and secure a brighter future for their children." 9 The thrust of
the prudent use of energy and other natural resources, and protect the physical
environment.
42 U.S.C. § 4502(d) (1988).
89. James, supra note 83, at 31.
90. Id (quoting President Carter).
91. Id. at 32.
92. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., A NEW PARTNERSHIP TO CONSERVE
AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL URBAN POLICY: THE PRESIDENT'S URBAN AND
REGIONAL POLICY GROUP REPORT PI-P2 (1978).
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this administration's policies was to aid people and cities in distress by
* expanding targeted job programs to create more jobs for the
long-term unemployed;
" increasing housing assistance programs to provide improved
housing for many low and moderate income households;
* restructuring the Community Development Block Grant-
program to focus on the most needy cities, neighborhoods
and people;
* initiating the Urban Development Action Grant program
(UDAG) to encourage public and private investment in the
nation's distressed cities;
* strengthening the countercyelical public works program and
extending anti-recession fiscal assistance;
* reforming and strengthening equal opportunity and affirma-
tive action efforts.93
Recognizing that the federal government lacked the means to tackle
all the problems of the cities, the Carter Administration declared its in-
tent to foster a new partnership among the states, local governments, the
private sector and individuals. Carter's 1980 national urban policy re-
port confirmed this commitment to work in partnership "to strengthen
urban economies, improve job opportunities and job mobility for the
long-term unemployed, promote fiscal stability, expand opportunity for
those disadvantaged by discrimination and poverty, and encourage en-
ergy-efficient and environmentally-sound patterns of urban develop-
ment."94 In order to limit unnecessary federal activities that competed
with the goals of the urban policy, an impact analysis of new or signifi-
cantly changed nonurban programs of the federal government was also
proposed.95 The major legislative thrust of this wave of Carter urban
policy was in the economic development area through programs that
would make "grants, loan guarantees, and interest subsidies available to
private firms investing in distressed communities." 96 This would have
been carried out by the National Development Bank, had Congress ap-
proved its creation as proposed in 1978.97
In contrast to the ambitious inaugural urban policy report that was
backed up with an $8.3 billion package of budget proposals, the Carter
Administration's 1980 urban policy report was "heavy on administrative
93. Id. at P5-P6.
94. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (1980) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
95. James, supra note 83, at 33.
96. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 94, at 4.
97. Id.
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tinkering-interagency agreements, guideline revisions, improved criteria
for measuring urban impact and the like-and light on actions that cost
money." 9
8
D. The President's Commission for A National Agenda for the Eighties
In October 1979, President Carter founded the President's Commis-
sion for a National Agenda for the Eighties to advise the next President
and a new Congress on a wide range of policy issues, including national
urban policy. In what Charles Orlebeke refers to as a "painful footnote"
to the Carter urban policy record,99 the report of the urban panel on
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan America forcefully rejected the
Carter Administration's place-oriented urban policies that "bond[ ] the
underclass to locations of limited opportunity."'" "In the oversimplified
terms of the 'people vs. places' debate, it was people who mattered." '
The President's Commission favored policies to promote national
economic growth without regard to their impacts on distressed cities,
and programs to help the disadvantaged wherever they reside. It urged
the American people to be "skeptical of narrowly defined, local economic
development efforts, which have been associated with the promise of re-
storing vitality to a wide variety of local communities as if each were a
self-contained entity."10 2 Concluding that "the principal role of the fed-
eral government should be to assist communities in adjusting to redis-
tributional trends,"10 a the panel urged the next President to balance
urban policies so that "[p]eople-to-jobs strategies, whether by retraining
or relocation or both, ... receive the same degree of emphasis that is now
reserved for jobs-to-people strategies." 1" A more place-neutral urban
policy would focus on "upgrading the unskilled through manpower de-
velopment efforts so that existing local job opportunities can be ex-
ploited, by removing barriers to mobility that prevent people from
migrating to locations of economic opportunity, and by providing migra-
tion assistance to those who wish and need it."'10 5
98. Orlebeke, supra note 76, at 198.
99. Id.
100. John D. Kasarda, Introduction, in URBAN AMERICA IN THE EIGHTIES: PERSPEC-
TIVES AND PROSPECTS vii (Donald A. Hicks ed., 1982) [hereinafter URBAN AMERICA IN THE
EIGHTIES].
101. Orlebeke, supra note 76, at 198.
102. URBAN AMERICA IN THE EIGHTIES, supra note 100, at 5.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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E. The Reagan Urban Policy
By essentially adopting the Carter commission's proposals, the Rea-
gan Administration's 1982 urban policy report repudiated the Carter Ad-
ministration's policies that targeted federal assistance to distressed cities.
While its National Economic Recovery Program-featuring "tax cuts,
reductions in the rate of federal spending, regulatory relief, and monetary
restraint to restore economic vitality to American industry and create
jobs for workers"-was largely consistent with the recommendation of
the President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, the
Reagan Administration ignored the Commission's call for programs that
would implement the necessary "people-to-jobs" strategies of such a
place-neutral urban policy.106
The first Reagan urban policy report also proposed a new kind of
federalism that would shift decision-making responsibilities for urban-
oriented programs from the federal to state governments. Under this
new arrangement, more than thirty grant-in-aid programs would be
folded into a new state-administered block grant. 107 In a related theme
that was not picked up in subsequent reports, it argued that central city
fiscal problems were caused by "arbitrary boundaries and inadequate
state and metropolitan fiscal equalization policies" rather than by federal
cutbacks, and called for cities and suburbs to consider forming a metro-
politan government or adopting some form of revenue sharing. 108
Subsequent Reagan Administration urban policy reports steadfastly
held to the belief that " 'a healthy economy... is our most powerful tool
for revitalizing our cities and improving their fiscal positions.' ,19
However, while the 1984 report noted that "[o]ur cities and urban areas
are, in general, reaping the benefits of the nation's economic turn-
around,"' 110 by 1988 the Administration acknowledged that economic re-
covery would not be enough for certain cities with long-term structural
problems. The 1988 urban policy report identified a litany of urban
problems that had worsened even while the national economy was grow-
ing: (1) high unemployment and skill deficiencies among youth and the
disadvantaged; (2) illiteracy and high dropout rates in public schools; (3)
alarming numbers of teenage pregnancies; (4) a high incidence of single-
106. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
REPORT 3-4 (1982).
107. THE POTOMAC INST., METROPOLITAN HOUSING MEMORANDUM 82-2, at 1 (1982).
108. Id.
109. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
REPORT: A CRITIQUE 2 (1984).
110. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
REPORT (1984) (transmittal letter).
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parent households headed by poor women; (5) neighborhoods with high
concentrations of the poor and disadvantaged; (6) housing programs that
lock the needy into neighborhoods without jobs or access to jobs; and (7)
inadequate provision for occupational or geographic mobility for workers
displaced by rapid structural change."' The Administration's major re-
sponse to these problems was its controversial proposal to create a series
of Enterprise Zones in distressed cities to stimulate private investment.
The 1988 urban policy report also identified the primary cause of
severe urban distress, namely, "the proliferation of single-parent families,
ineffective schools, and drug addiction and crime." ' 2 The report also
expressed the Administration's frustration with the fact that these
problems seemed "to resist simple economic and fiscal success."'13 The
report repeated the administration's previous calls for an Enterprise
Zone legislation and recognized the need for other refinements in urban
policy that emphasize "measures to reinforce family stability, especially
among those with low incomes, and increase family options to obtain
jobs and educational opportunities.""' 4
F. The Bush Urban Policy
The 1990 national urban policy report strongly critiques the John-
son Administration's war on poverty and claims that the "Bush Admin-
istration is making the boldest, most comprehensive effort of the last
quarter century to address the problem of long-term poverty, by ex-
panding opportunity, jobs, and homeownership, and increasing the qual-
ity of education for low income Americans.""'  According to
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Jack
Kemp, "one major defect of the first war on poverty was its failure to
make proper and effective use of the incentives on which private enter-
prise relies to reward work and achievement."' 1 6 In contrast, the Bush
Administration's new war on poverty would empower residents of dis-
tressed communities by eliminating "governmental and nongovernmen-
tal barriers to opportunity in America-to expand choices for the poor so
that they can make their own decisions and control their own lives."
' 1 7
111. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
REPORT 1 (1988).
112. Id
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., THE PRESIDENT's NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
REPORT 1-1 (1990).
116. Id
117. Id.
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Empowerment, according to the 1990 report, "is neither wasteful extrav-
agance nor austerity, neither increasing government dependency nor lais-
sez-faire abandonment of those in need. Instead, empowerment and
opportunity require that government build incentives to work, save, and
to create enterprise in its strategy of waging war on poverty. '11 8
The Bush Administration's new war on poverty, which Jack Kemp
has also referred to as America's second Civil Rights revolution, contains
nine program elements:
1. Expanded refundable tax credits for child care.
2. Capital gains tax cut.
3. Enterprise Zones.
4. Assistance to low income tenants of public housing to man-
age and eventually own their own homes.
5. Job training improvement proposals.
6. Encouragement of state and local innovations in the design
of assistance programs to promote self-reliance and transi-
tion from dependency to self-support.
7. Government construction opportunities for unemployed
workers through relaxed Davis-Bacon provisions.
8. Reduction of de facto discrimination in the housing market
by examining the effects of local rent control and zoning reg-
ulations, and challenging them where necessary.
9. Reduction of unfair taxation of senior citizens who want to
stay in the work force through a modest liberalization of the
Social Security earnings test; and tax relief for low-income
families through increases in child credits and wage credits
for low income workers in Enterprise Zones.119
G. The Clinton Urban Agenda
It is still too early to determine the parameters of the Clinton Ad-
ministration's national urban policy. Nevertheless, the Clinton/Gore vi-
sion for America contained in their campaign publication, Putting People
First, previews an ambitious urban agenda. In founding its urban pro-
gram on a national economic recovery-"To rebuild America's cities, the
most important thing we can do is to implement a national economic
strategy that pulls us out of the recession" 12' -the Clinton/Gore urban
strategy sounds similar to the initial Reagan urban policy. Unlike Rea-
gan, however, Clinton/Gore would combine stimulative anti-recession-
118. Id. at 1-2.
119. Id. at 1-1.
120. BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL CHANGE
AMERICA 52 (1992).
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ary investments with substantial federal initiatives designed to expand
inner city investment and job opportunities. Under a Clinton/Gore ur-
ban policy:
The federal government should create conditions conducive to
economic recovery through a national economic strategy,
targeted incentives and grants designed to revitalize the urban
economy, and measures that empower city residents to take ad-
vantage of newly created opportunities through expanded edu-
cation, job training, and child-care services. In return for
federal assistance, the cities will adopt comprehensive strategies
leading to revitalized urban centers; take advantage of opportu-
nities created by the federal/municipal partnership to attract
business and expand the urban economic base; and play a key
role in the empowerment of urban residents as the primary pro-
vider of education, housing, and crime prevention.'2 1
To put Americans back to work while enhancing productivity and
economic competitiveness, Clinton would target federal funding and lo-
cal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)122 spending to re-
build roads, bridges, water and sewer treatment plants, and to build low-
income housing. I 23 He would embellish the Reagan Enterprise Zone
initiative with additional incentives for companies who hire inner-city
residents. 24 To restore the flow of credit to urban areas, Clinton recom-
mends more aggressive enforcement of the Community Reinvestment
Act, which requires financial institutions to invest in their inner city
communities, and more rigorous training of federal bank regulators that
will enable them to identify redlining and other prohibited lending prac-
tices.' 25  To stimulate small business start-ups, cultivate the en-
trepreneurial spirit, and revive inner city economies, Clinton would
create a network of community development banks, which are commu-
nity-based depository institutions that provide affordable credit along
with technical assistance to low-income businesses. 126
The Clinton program also emphasizes human capital development
and rewards individual initiative and family responsibility: "No matter
how hard we work to make the federal/municipal partnership a success,
121. Id. at 54.
122. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 653 (1974).
123. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 120, at 55.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 114; see 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988); see also Marion A. Cowell, Jr. & Monty D.
Hagler, The Community Reinvestment Act in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 83, 87-94, 97-100 (1992) (discussing the development of the Act and the need
for strengthened enforcement).
126. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 120, at 55.
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we will make no progress unless individuals take responsibility for their
own lives, working tirelessly to overcome challenges and solve problems
in their families and communities."' 27 Putting People First calls for an
expansion of job training programs funded in part by employers who
would be required to spend 1.5% of their payroll for continuing educa-
tion and training of their work forces. 128 Recipients of large federal con-
tracts also would be required to create a mentorship, after-school
employment, or summer employment program for urban and rural dis-
advantaged youth. 129 By significantly expanding the Head Start and Wo-
men, Infants and Children (WIC) programs, and increasing the Earned
Income Tax Credit to ensure that no families that work full-time remain
in poverty, the Clinton Administration would invest heavily in America's
children, with stricter education and training requirements on people re-
ceiving public assistance, so that welfare is "a second chance, not a way
of life."'"3 Finally, in what may be the most significant departure from
previous administrations' urban agendas, the Clinton/Gore plan also em-
braces education and health care reforms, without which neither the
economies nor the livability of cities can possibly be restored.
IV. NATIONAL URBAN POLICY: A FLAWED CONTENT
OR CONCEPT?
If the Carter counter-cyclical urban policies can be criticized for
their view that our older cities' "decline in economic competitiveness is
temporary, and therefore to be combated with temporary economic stim-
ulus,"'' the Reagan macroeconomic urban policies can be faulted for
ignoring the unique problems of our large cities altogether, mistakenly
assuming that a rising tide would lift all boats. The Bush/Kemp urban
policies changed that approach with strategies to strengthen inner-city
communities. The aim was to empower the poor through a kind of "op-
portunity capitalism" featuring the ownership transfer of public housing
and other asset-building initiatives. The potential effectiveness of these
narrow place-based policies, however, are limited by the absence of any
larger domestic investment strategy to improve either America's compet-
itiveness or her cities.
After almost a quarter century of biennial national urban policy re-
ports, there has been little serious analysis of the impacts of the various
127. Id. at 54.
128. Id at 56.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. THE URBAN INST., supra note 43, at 7.
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policies and even less consideration of the policy process itself-how re-
ports are prepared and their recommendations translated into action
agendas. The limited literature on the subject, however, confirms the
pessimistic view of a former high-ranking HUD official that "[a]lthough
urban policymaking and report-writing should not be equated, the irrele-
vance of the President's Report is a fitting metaphor for the state of ex-
plicit urban policy." '132 Orlebeke and others attribute the failures of past
comprehensive national urban policies to five factors: (1) the intractable
nature of urban problems; (2) organizational disarray at HUD; (3) the
problems coordinating programs across federal agencies; (4) the limits of
federal authority; and (5) the lack of sustained presidential leadership.
Each of these issues is discussed briefly below.
A. The Nature of Urban Problems
Evidence abounds that our nation is paying a heavy price for "cram-
ming the poor into constricted center cities while suburbia maintains its
walls of segregation." 13 3 Nevertheless, nearly twenty-five years of na-
tional urban policy efforts lead us to conclude that "[t]he inescapable
reality of urban problems is that they don't easily lend or commend
themselves to the political attractions of national action." 13 4 Notwith-
standing the unpopularity of an urban agenda, Paul Ylvisaker believes
that urban problems are nationally pervasive, threatening and conse-
quential, and thus compel us to action. He argues that the price we will
pay for ignoring the problems of cities and the education and training
needs of central-city youth-a generation too precious to waste-is a per-
manent loss of economic competitiveness. 135 President Clinton's newly
appointed economic policy czar, Robert Rubin, shares this sentiment; he
has stated that the urban underclass represent "an enormous albatross
around the economy" because they impose such high costs on the rest of
society and represent a loss of human potential and productivity.
1 36
And, pointing out that there "are things the private sector won't do that
need to get done" and that "government must play an active role,"137
Rubin would seem to support some kind of national urban policy.
132. Orlebeke, supra note 76 at 185.
133. Peirce, supra note 1, at 22.
134. Paul Ylvisaker, Eliciting an Effective and Necessary Policy Response, in THE FUTURE
OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 346, 346.
135. Id. at 348.
136. Steven Mufson, A Wall Street Whiz Takes a Gamble, WASH. PosT, Dec. 21-27, 1992,
at 12, 13 (Weekly Edition) (quoting Robert Rubin, Chairman of the White House National
Economic Council).
137. Id.
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Another conclusion we can draw from our experiences is that, quite
apart from its technical soundness, an urban policy that targets a dispro-
portionate share of federal resources to a limited number of distressed
cities and their residents cannot be sustained politically. In a retrospec-
tive analysis of the failure of the Carter urban policy, which he helped
craft, Franklin James concludes that the geographic targeting of urban
aid "had the effect of virtually eliminating support for urban policy from
the southern and western regions,... [and that] [p]rograms targeted to
the disadvantaged are highly vulnerable in political terms."'' 38
Targeted programs are more likely to be strong politically when
they serve low-income and moderate-income working families
as well as the very poor. They are also more likely to succeed
when they are regarded as providing an earned benefit or are
otherwise linked to work, when they are entitlement programs
with federally prescribed and funded benefits, when they seem
effective, and when they are not provided in the form of cash
welfare assistance for young, able-bodied people who do not
work. 139
Analysis also suggests that
"if there is one lesson we have learned from all the evaluations
and research that has been conducted since the War on Poverty
began, it is that service programs that provide limited benefits
to many people, although politically popular, are not effective
in responding to the problems of the most seriously
disadvantaged."
James's analysis of the Carter urban policy suggests that the polit-
ical vulnerability of targeted programs not only confronts voter opposi-
tion, but also faces reluctance by local politicians to concentrate
assistance on the severely disadvantaged, hard-core poor.
[E]fforts by the Carter administration to target CETA benefits
to highly disadvantaged persons, though initially supported by
the Congress, may ultimately have backfired by weakening city
support for the program. Cities benefitted from loose targeting
in the early years of the CETA program because it enabled
them to use much of the resources from the program for fiscal
relief. Tighter targeting precluded them from hiring the kinds
of workers needed for many civil service positions. The erosion
of city support was one factor contributing to the demise of the
CETA program during the early years of the Reagan
138. James, supra note 83, at 35.
139. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & PAUL E. PETERSON, THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 438 (1991).
140. Id. at 457 (quoting Isabel Sawhill).
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Administration. 4'
B. Issues Internal to HUD
Urbanists, including academics who have served at Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), believe that national urban
policies have failed largely because of issues relating to the structure, mis-
sion, and effectiveness of HUD, the government agency that historically
has taken the lead in urban policy development. Three types of failings
have been identified. First, from its inception in 1965, HUD was not
given control over federal responsibilities and resources of vital urban
significance. Excluded from HUD's portfolio, for example, were pov-
erty, environment and transportation programs, and even the housing
programs administered by the Department of Agriculture and the Veter-
ans Administration.142 Moreover, from the beginning, HUD has been
required to pursue the incompatible goals of housing and cities. Accord-
ing to two architects of the 1978 Carter urban policy, "[t]he more power-
ful side of HUD-the housing side-legitimately is concerned primarily
with housing production, housing market trends, and housing develop-
ments in suburbia; the urban policy side of HUD, generally is concerned
with restraining decentralization trends and its perceived corollary sub-
urban housing production."' 43 Unable to agree on its own mission,
"consistency concerning urban policy or programs at any one point in
time has been more the exception than the rule [at HUD]."'" Lacking a
consistent philosophy, HUD has been largely unable to marshall support
from other agencies in pursuit of national urban policy objectives.
Political scientist and former high-ranking HUD official Robert
Wood with Beverly Klimkowsky have identified seven traditional meas-
ures of federal organizational effectiveness: (1) prestige in the eyes of the
Washington power community, (2) the extent of intradepartmental com-
petitive or complementary behavior, (3) the comparative power of cen-
teles, (4) the relative complexity of programs, (5) the clarity of legal
jurisdiction over assigned program responsibilities, (6) the degree of ex-
pertise acknowledged in the department's work, and (7) the relative fre-
quency of presidential and congressional intervention in program
management and the department's work. 145 Wood and Klimkowsky also
141. James, supra note 83, at 35.
142. Robert Wood & Beverly M. Klinkowsky, HUD in the Nineties: Doubt-ability and Do-
ability, in THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 254.
143. Kaplan & James, supra note 3, at 358-59.
144. Id. at 358.
145. Wood & Klimkowsky, supra note 142, at 257.
19931 1765
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
concluded that "by nearly all of these standards, HUD fares badly." '
HUD lacks prestige; is plagued by intra-agency feuding; and lacks legal
jurisdiction over important city/suburban fiscal land use, and civil rights
issues.147 HUD's lack of clout and prestige is summed up in the words of
a former local official who became a HUD assistant secretary:
I used to think the Secretary of HUD was equivalent to a Car-
dinal, guaranteeing an invitation to the Pope. Big deall When
you get over to Washington, you realize that the Secretary of
HUD is the low person on the totem pole. It's the least impor-
tant Cabinet position and no one really cares what they think
about anything. They don't participate in any of the inner Cab-
inet Committees. 148
Finally, Anthony Downs attributes much of HUD's ineffectiveness
to an "'iron law of political dispersion' " that results in many programs
receiving money in such small allocations as to insure that national pro-
gram goals cannot be met.49 Downs does not blame HUD for all of its
limitations because he believes that the agency is "an ineffective symbolic
gesture of concern" that was designed to fail. "'He contends that it was
never meant to succeed-instead, it was intended to show concern, alle-
viate some problems, but not to change the tide of urban problems or
alter the direction of underlying economic and social forces.' ,15o
C. Interagency Coordination
From the beginning of the national urban policy process in the
Nixon Administration and extending through the Carter years, it was
recognized that the breadth and scope of federal policies with urban im-
plications spilled beyond HUD's walls, and that some interagency entity
would have to be created to formulate and implement these policies. For
multiple reasons, including interagency competition, the lack of sus-
tained backing from the White House, and the fact that agencies are
more responsive to their own "iron triangles"-comprised of congres-
sional committees, constituent groups and agency bureaucrats-than to a
loosely organized, ad hoc interagency organization, none of these vehi-
cles worked.
In the Nixon Administration, the institutional vehicle for formulat-
ing and implementing urban policies was the Council for Urban Affairs;
146. Id.
147. Id. at 256.
148. Id. at 255 (statement of a former HUD assistant secretary of planning and community
development during the Carter Administration).
149. Id. at 266 (quoting Anthony Downs).
150. Id. (quoting Anthony Downs).
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the Council was composed of cabinet secretaries from eight domestic
agencies. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the President's Counselor on Urban
Affairs, was appointed Executive Secretary of the Council. Charles
Orlebeke, a former HUD official in the Ford Administration and chroni-
cler of the national urban policy process, notes "how the search for broad
policy can be quickly overwhelmed by the pressures of ad hoc decision-
making, the unavoidable complexity of the policymaking machinery, and
the competition among executive agencies"' 51 so that the coordinating
mechanism cannot maintain a disciplined focus on urban concerns. He
asserts that "the frustration associated with these forces was part of the
reason the Nixon Administration, in effect, gave up on national urban
policy at midterm and shifted to advocating a radical restructuring of
domestic programs along New Federalism lines." '152
While he never had a chance to implement his urban policy, Presi-
dent Ford created a Cabinet Committee on Urban Development and
Neighborhood Revitalization which was chaired by HUD Secretary
Carla Hills in 1977, whose mandate was to "develop an urban policy to
guide the hoped-for second term."' 53 Jimmy Carter's approach to the
coordination issue was similar to Ford's. "Upon taking office, Carter
formed a cabinet-level Urban and Regional Policy Group (URPG) to
formulate an urban policy." However, according to Franklin James, a
participant in the process, "[n]either the President nor the White House
staff provided effective leadership for the effort."' 54 As a result, "[tlhe
URPG process quickly became dominated by agency competition for ad
hoc proposals rather than by thoughtful consideration of problems or
policy.' 155
Formal interagency coordinating mechanisms were absent in the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, for different reasons. In Reagan's
case, national urban policy was defined as the Administration's national
economic recovery program (i.e., there was no explicit urban policy).
The Bush Administration's narrow urban policy featuring the privatiza-
tion of public housing could be implemented exclusively by HUD.
D. The Limits of Federal Authority
In addition to the above limitations, there is a limit to executive
branch authority. The federal government does not always have a grip
151. Orlebeke, supra note 76, at 191.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 197.
154. James, supra note 83, at 31.
155. Id. at 32.
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on the policy levers necessary to effectuate desired changes. Despite
massive resident income differentials between cities and suburbs and the
resulting fiscal capacities, the President cannot impose a metropolitan
form of government upon these entities or force them to create tax base
sharing systems. Nor can he direct suburban communities to eliminate
all land use control and regulatory barriers to the production of afforda-
ble housing in their metropolitan areas. While Congress has the power
to redistribute income through the tax system to ameliorate central-city
income deficits and can use carrots and sticks to encourage states and
localities to "do the right thing," the political will to do so has been
lacking.
The Carter urban policy, the most aggressive of all national efforts
to deal with urban problems, failed, in part, for the above reasons. Ac-
cording to James:
The Carter urban policy committed the federal government to
solving fiscal and economic problems of cities, despite the fact
that states had the principal powers shaping these dimensions
of the well-being of cities.... States have the land use planning
and regulatory powers needed to control urban sprawl or to
limit undesirable suburban or nonmetropolitan competition
with cities ... [as a result,] the implementation of the urban
policy repeatedly placed the federal government in the no-win
position of intervening in bailiwicks such as highway planning
where states had more power and where states did not share
federal goals.... The Carter urban policy was developed with-
out significant state participation and was implemented largely
independent of the states. In part, as a result, significant state
actions in support of the policy were few and far between.15 6
Accepting the limitations above, the federal government can still act
more aggressively to enforce existing civil rights laws, including fair
housing, and to see to the provision of affordable mortgage financing and
access to commercial credit. The Clinton Administration already has
committed to act in these areas.
E. The Lack of Sustained Presidential Leadership
When all else fails, presidential leadership can often save the day.
Aside from presidential pronouncements on the importance of cities,
however, no national urban policy has received the kind of sustained
presidential support that is required to assure its implementation. In-
deed, to the extent that the literature deals with this subject at all, it is
156. Id at 35.
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replete with references to presidential indifference at best, and, at worst,
outright hostility to the ends and means of their administrations' urban
policies. For example, President Nixon tried to constrain HUD's activi-
ties and, "when it became apparent that [HUD Secretary] George Rom-
ney was successfully implementing the Democratic program contained in
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, [he] replaced him
with James Lynn, whose job was reputed to be to shut down HUD.'
Arguing that the high costs of federal housing assistance threatened to
mortgage the nation's future, Nixon imposed a moratorium on all federal
low-income housing programs and impounded nearly $13 billion of
HUD appropriations.158
President Ford paid relatively little attention to HUD's urban
agenda during his limited tenure, while Jimmy Carter significantly en-
larged the agency's portfolio by greatly expanding the Section 8 housing
program. Carter's administration was the first to fulfill the congressional
mandate for a comprehensive national urban policy report, but he is re-
ported to have kept such a careful eye on HUD's activities that it evoked
"formal secretarial protests."' 59 And while Carter's urban policy and
the "accompanying budget proposals added up to an impressive rhetori-
cal commitment to address the economic and fiscal problems of older
central cities," he "telegraphed his ambivalence when at the last moment
before the policy's public release, he nearly withdrew large parts of the
budget proposals."'"
Ronald Reagan's mistaking his own HUD Secretary for a mayor is a
metaphor for his administration's eight years of indifference to urban
problems. And although the Bush Administration's urban policy was
directed by the HUD Secretary, it was not until the Los Angeles riots in
April 1992 that the President actively promoted Jack Kemp's public
housing conversion and empowerment policies.
Two questions em6rge from the above analysis. First, does the
rather dismal record detailed above support the continuation of the Pres-
ident's biennial urban policy report? Second, assuming that an impor-
tant national purpose is served by paying special attention to urban
problems, what part of the executive branch should be responsible? With
respect to the former, those who have studied the subject concur with
Paul Ylvisaker's comment that "the question is not so much whether we
have a national urban policy... ; it's basically the challenge whether as a
157. Wood & Klimkowsky, supra note 142, at 264.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Orlebeke, supra note 76, at 198.
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nation we're going to struggle explicitly with the problems the urban
agenda represents." '161 "[W]hat is needed," says Ylvisaker, "is a national
commitment and a readiness to consider all sorts of national policies (tax,
employment, industrial development, education, training, etc.) in terms
of their impact on the special problems of central cities." '162
In reflecting on this issue at the end of Reagan's second term, which
they saw as disastrous for central cities, Marshall Kaplan and James ar-
gued that the political climate would not support an explicit urban
agenda, and that "the best way to help cities could well be to encourage
those fostering national domestic policy reforms to factor in city con-
cerns."16 In a "grab what you can" urban strategy, they urged city ad-
vocates to "try their best to gain the best possible deal they can from the
new nonurban policies and programs likely to evolve through the Bush
Administration and Congress." 164
With the election of Bill Clinton on an investment-oriented platform
of "putting people first" that features an explicit urban agenda, it would
be a mistake to call for the elimination of the President's biennial urban
policy report. However, Norman Glickman, Kaplan, and James, among
others, are right that the totality of nonurban federal policies and pro-
grams have, and will probably continue to have, greater impact on cities
than do explicitly urban policies. 161
Because the Clinton agenda for the cities has been drawn broadly to
include education and health care policies in addition to the traditional
urban concerns, the placement of responsibility for urban policy is espe-
cially crucial in this administration. Clearly, as in previous administra-
tions, the biennial urban policy report needs to be drafted under the
auspices of some kind of interagency task force. Also, if we are to take
James's criticism of the Carter process seriously, to the extent that imple-
mentation of the President's urban agenda will require the active cooper-
ation of other governmental levels, states and localities should be invited
to participate in the policy formulation process.1 66 The same applies to
the community sector.
The Clinton "Putting People First" plan clearly views urban policy
as a subset of an expansive, investment-oriented domestic policy. There-
161. Ylvisaker, supra note 134, at 348.
162. Id. at 348-49.
163. Kaplan & James, supra note 3, at 356.
164. Id.
165. NORMAN J. GLICKMAN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE CITIES: IN SEARCH OF REA-
GAN'S REAL URBAN POLICY 2 (Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Working Paper
No. 26, 1984); Kaplan & James, supra note 3, at 356.
166. James, supra note 83, at 34.
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fore, the logical chair of the urban policy taskforce is the President's as-
sistant for economic policy. This is a new position created by President
Clinton "to coordinate economic matters the way the President's na-
tional security adviser oversees foreign affairs." '16 7 Only by assigning the
urban policy responsibility to a senior White House official who has the
ear of the President on a day-to-day basis can interagency coordination
be maximized, and the principles of opportunity, community, and re-
sponsibility-the building blocks of Clinton's urban agenda-be put into
practice in our nation's cities.16
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR A NEW NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
There are essentially three alternatives for designing the next gener-
ation of national urban policy that have a firm footing in Clinton's ambi-
tious "Putting People First" campaign that, if implemented, could
significantly improve urban conditions. The first, which I refer to as the
competitive city strategy, emphasizes macro-level investment policies in
the physical and human capital required to improve America's competi-
tiveness, while conceding the importance that cities play in today's
knowledge-based economy. This strategy anticipates significant new fed-
eral spending of at least $80 billion over the next four years. 169 The sec-
ond approach, which I refer to as a community development strategy,
decouples national urban policy considerations from macroeconomic pol-
icies, anticipates few new major federal spending initiatives to improve
productivity, and concentrates on finding ways to improve the quality of
life in depressed cities and neighborhoods within existing resource con-
straints. This approach recognizes the considerable housing and eco-
nomic development successes that community-based organizations have
enjoyed in inner cities across the country during the 1980s, and recom-
mends policies to accelerate their progress during the 1990s. The third
approach, a blended urban policy strategy, appreciates the continuing im-
portance of cities in today's global economy, takes specific account of the
spatial implications of macroeconomic policies and productivity-enhanc-
ing capital investments, and utilizes the strengths of the community sec-
tor to rebuild the physical and human capital of urban America.
A. The Competitive City Strategy
Emphasizing macroeconomic and fiscal policies to improve national
economic performance, this Clinton national urban policy will reach fur-
167. Mufson, supra note 136, at 12.
168. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 120, at 53-54.
169. Id. at 144.
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ther than the President's Commission for a National Agenda for the
Eighties by formally recognizing the importance of cities in today's
knowledge-based economy. This strategy would attempt to close the in-
vestment gap between America and her global competitors who,
throughout the 1980s, "invest[ed] more than twelve times what we spend
on roads, bridges, sewers, and the information networks and technologies
of the future." 170 The prizes in this knowledge-based economy are "the
headquarter functions and the related clusters of producer services that
finance and serve them. They will locate in the places that can provide
them with the kinds of labor forces, services, facilities, and amenities they
need to function most effectively. '171
A national urban policy that focuses on improving America's global
competitiveness cannot ignore the people and places left behind. At least
two elements of the Clinton domestic agenda are relevant here. The first
of these is an ambitious defense conversion program that would "ensure
that the communities and millions of talented workers that won the Cold
War don't get left out in the cold."'172 Second, without an adequately
trained labor force, economic growth will grind to a halt, and
demographics suggest that by the turn of the century a substantial por-
tion of all new entrants into the labor force will be non-white, non-native
born residents of major cities. Economic policies that ignore the plight of
our central cities also ignore the monumental costs that such benign ne-
glect implies for both the public and private sectors. Royce Hanson sum-
marizes these quite well:
Alongside the underclass, feeding on it, and sucking resources
from the mainstream, there is in every considerable city a flour-
ishing underground economy. The traffic in drugs, vice, stolen
property, illegal gambling, and other crime can safely be esti-
mated to exceed almost any other single industry in any city.
The costs to the public for operation of the criminal justice sys-
tem, other public services and facilities, and revenues not col-
lected on illegal transactions represent a major part of a city's
budget. The costs to the private sector in security, insurance
rates, losses in goods and productivity, and the opportunity
costs of billions of dollars invested in criminal enterprises
rather than in the mainstream economy are monumental. To
these financial costs, we should add the cost of lost public confi-
dence in institutions resulting from corruption of public offi-
170. Id. at 143.
171. ROYCE HANSON, URBANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE POLICY ISSuES 22 (1986).
172. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 120, at 144.
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cials, police, and private firms and labor organizations. 173
The urban component of a national growth strategy would be
anchored in campaigns to improve the quality of tomorrow's labor force.
This means heavy emphasis on education reform at all levels, including
fully funding Head Start and the WIC program, and promoting other
programs "which help[ ] disadvantaged parents work with their children
to build an ethic of learning at home that benefits both."174 It could also
include new initiatives for community college, vocational and technical
training of non-college-bound young people, and a youth conservation
corps or other enterprises to prepare inner-city youth for future employ-
ment in the private labor market. It would certainly include welfare re-
form since welfare does not cure poverty and the current system contains
serious work disincentives. Decent-paying job opportunities must be
available for welfare recipients who are willing and able to work, and
since those who work their way off welfare lose Medicaid benefits, wel-
fare reform must be accompanied by health care reform.1 5 This strategy
would also upgrade the importance of a host of recently enacted, but
poorly funded, family self-sufficiency programs that were built into the
1990 National Affordable Housing Act. 176 These programs seek to tie
the receipt of federal housing assistance to the recipient's willingness to
improve her education and employability. Thus far, however, Congress
has failed to appropriate funds for the crucial services components of
these self-sufficiency programs.
A competitive cities strategy also would require the federal govern-
ment to eliminate barriers to mobility, both within metropolitan areas
and across states. Mobility enhancing programs range all the way from
the federal government standardizing AFDC benefits-that currently
range for a family of three from 16% of the poverty level in Alabama to
75% of the poverty level in Connecticut-and assuming their full costs,
to a more aggressive enforcement of fair housing laws, and to the crea-
tion of programs that assist black and other minority inner-city families
to move to the suburbs where the jobs are. 177
173. HANSON, supra note 171, at 11-12.
174. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 120, at 60.
175. Laurie McGinley, Clinton Faces Daunting Task in Turning Welfare Rhetoric Into a
Coherent Policy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1992, at A12.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12701 (Supp. 1990) (originally enacted as Cranston-Gonzalez National
Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990)).
177. See James E. Rosenbaum, Black Pioneers-Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase
Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children?, 2 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 1179, 1183-91
(1991).
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B. A Community Development Strategy
An alternative approach to national urban policy would examine
ways to strengthen communities and improve life opportunities for poor
and minority families in the worst sections of cities regardless of
macroeconomic policies and the state of the national economy. This ap-
proach would take the position that, while national policies that succeed
in fostering high rates of economic growth are better than those that do
not, experience shows that the fruits of economic growth do not auto-
matically benefit distressed cities, neighborhoods, or the poor. More-
over, ghetto communities have become poorer, more racially
concentrated, and more isolated than they were a decade ago when pol-
icy analysts debated whether national urban policies should emphasize
so-called ghetto enrichment or integration strategies. 178 In practical
terms, such strategy's time may already have passed. For these reasons,
even if the Congress were to emphasize deficit reduction over national
investment to a much greater degree than Clinton preferred, Clinton's
Administration should still consider pursuing a national urban policy
that works to improve the quality of life in poor communities, regardless
of the specifics of national economic policies. This approach requires a
community development-based national urban policy.
I use the term community development to refer to "efforts to im-
prove the overall quality of life in a low-income neighborhood through
such initiatives as housing renovation, refurbishing of streets and public
places, upgrading of public services, promotion of community identity
and pride, job training and social services for community residents, and
political advocacy." 179 This is consistent with the Clinton/Gore intent
that "[c]ommunity groups and local citizen organizations will be the
backbone of our urban improvement efforts."'1 80 A community develop-
ment-oriented national urban policy would give formal recognition to the
growing network of nonprofit, community-based organizations that have
worked tirelessly to improve the quality of life in depressed cities and
sections of cities since the 1960s, and especially through the Reagan-era
cutbacks in domestic programs. In the pre-Reagan days of the 1970s, it
is estimated that fewer than 250 community-based nonprofit organiza-
tions were involved in development activities. By the late 1980s, a na-
tional survey estimated the number of such entities to be in the range of
178. Anthony Downs, Alternative Futures for the American Ghetto, 1968 APPRAISAL J.
486, 498-501.
179. MARC BENDICK, JR. & MARY Lou EGAN, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT IN THE INNER-
CITY ENTERPRISE WITH COMMUNITY LINKS 1-2 (1991).
180. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 120, at 54.
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1500 to 2000.181 According to one source, community-based organiza-
tions have built nearly 125,000 units of housing, most of it for low in-
come families; developed 16.4 million square feet of retail space, offices,
industrial parks, and other industrial developments in economically dis-
tressed communities where for-profit developers would not venture; and
accounted for the creation and retention of nearly 90,000 jobs. I1 2
This approach to national urban policy argues that when commu-
nity-based institutions determine how to spend the billions of dollars of
existing federal resources for housing, community development, eco-
nomic development and social welfare, and when they participate in pro-
gram design to help traditional social welfare agencies become more
committed to "bottoms up" planning and program delivery, there would
be significant positive impacts on the quality of life in distressed commu-
nities. One example is targeting the $2 billion a year in public housing
modernization funds that the Congress already appropriates to local pub-
lic housing authorities to train inner-city youth in the construction
trades. Another example would be to use federal laws such as the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act 8 3 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act"8 4
to stimulate a continual flow of financial capital into minority and other
distressed communities; and to create a network of local community de-
velopment banks in inner-city areas to support small business enterprise,
microlending programs, etc. The Administration's proposal to create a
City Assistance Flexibility Program to allow cities to redirect the use of
fifteen percent of the federal assistance they receive to meet their own
community priorities and fund their local revitalization strategies would
further strengthen a community development-oriented national urban
policy.
In short, the Clinton Administration should propose such a policy
direction in the absence of new multi-billion dollar initiatives to improve
our national economic performance. Without such capital intensive poli-
cies, the most direct means of affecting positive change in depressed, re-
source-poor communities would be expanding and strengthening the
network of already existing indigenous, community-based organizations
that "have the political and technical skills and the tenacity needed to
pull together a complex array of resources needed to get projects
done."'8 5 This approach is premised on the belief that "[s]olutions to the
181. NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEV., AGAINST ALL ODDS:
THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (1989).
182. Id. at 1-2.
183. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988).
184. Id. § 2801 (1988).
185. NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEV., supra note 181, at 4.
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economic and social problems of minority and low-income communities
in the United States will continue to elude us as long as we ignore the
reality that those who are experiencing the problems have little or no
voice in designing solutions to those problems." '186
Having argued for a community development-oriented urban policy,
there are two complementary approaches that the Clinton Administra-
tion should pursue. The first would strengthen and expand the kinds of
mainstream community-based development organizations that have
partnered with traditional public agencies and the private business com-
munity to create housing and economic development projects. The
second approach would support the nascent concept of opportunity capi-
talism in the inner city that is being promoted by former HUD Secretary
Jack Kemp and such organizations as the National Center for Neighbor-
hood Enterprise. This concept emphasizes community self-help, home-
ownership, and asset accumulation, including resident management and
ownership of public housing, entrepreneurialism, and the creation of eco-
nomic opportunities that are largely independent of traditional social ser-
vice agencies and government institutions, the mainstream economy and
traditional business institutions. Although it has been argued that no
community or neighborhood is an independent entity, by emphasizing
the creation and ownership of businesses by local residents to service
their community, this approach to community development comes clos-
est to endorsing that concept of community independence.
C. A Blended Strategy
A blended approach to national urban policy, and the approach I
prefer, would recognize two links: those that exist between major na-
tional investment initiatives to improve America's competitiveness and
their impacts on cities, and those between macro investment policies and
their implementation at the community level. In addition to being sensi-
tive to the spatial impacts of national policies, a blended approach would
emphasize the importance of the community sector in the design and
implementation of local plans and projects as part of any large-scale na-
tional investment strategy. In practical terms, because the scale of na-
tional investment initiatives are likely to be modest, a blended approach
would disproportionately emphasize the importance of the community
sector in improving the quality of life in distressed communities. It
would permit the administration to examine the potential benefits of ex-
tending the public/private partnership model-as a means of reaching
186. Robert L. Woodson, Forward, in REVITALIZING OUR CITIES: NEW APPROACHES TO
SOLVING URBAN PROBLEMS xix (Mark Libsitz ed., 1986).
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consensus on community goals, agreement on institutional roles, and sus-
tained support for civic action-to accelerate the reform of traditional
housing and social service agencies and programs to promote community
revitalization, family development, and economic self-sufficiency.
Under a blended strategy, the Clinton Administration would tackle
what Hanson refers to as one of the greatest political challenges to the
next generation of urban policymakers:
[T]he invention of politically acceptable means of strategic
targeting of available resources rather than allowing them to
become subject to the iron law of political dispersion, which
gives wealthy cities resources they do not need to support de-
velopment that would likely occur without policy inducements
and provides inadequate resources to those places least able to
help themselves. 87
To conclude, the worsening problems of our cities are both cause
and consequence of our declining position in the world economy. In or-
der to reverse that decline, we must revitalize our cities and their people.
A coherent national urban policy is a necessary component of a larger
domestic strategy of "Putting People First."
Although we have once again witnessed in South Central Los Ange-
les the explosive effects of the conditions that "'breed despair and vio-
lence... : ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough
jobs' " 188-the same deadly mix that ignited Watts, Hough, the Central
Ward, and other inner cities more than twenty-five years ago-we are
reminded of Lyndon Johnson's appeal to the higher moral purpose of our
people. In his address to the nation on the riots of the 1960s, he argued
that we should be motivated to action" 'not because we are frightened by
conflict, but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them
because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly
society in America.' "189
187. HANSoN, supra note 171, at 24.
188. Lyndon B. Johnson, Address to the Nation (July 27, 1967), quoted in National Hous-
ing Law Project, Inc., supra note 75, at 45.
189. Id.
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